Big Picture: The decision to increase equities from 35% to 42% has
prompted some inquiry. While we have called or anticipated all of the
intermediate rallies, we did not increase the recommended weightings for
pension funds because the valuations were extraordinary, bullish opinion
was adamant, and the bear market was nowhere near the minimum duration of
3 years.
Of course, it is quite likely that the market will go to outstanding
valuations [outstanding valuations are 1 times book and a 6% dividend
yield, which are found at the end of bear markets.] but, until that is
accomplished, valuations will continue to be of little guidance on
intermediate rallies or declines.
While we still have high valuations, prices are lower than at any rally
point in the past 2 ˝ years and, of most importance, the bulls are
becoming dismayed. The latter is shown in the S&P registering capitulation
on the ChartWorks proprietary model. The weekly reading is kicking in as
it has on 13 such periods of heavy liquidation over the past 100 years.
Our view in 2000 was that there would be a number of capitulations until
the post-2000 bear was over. This is Number 4.
Also worth noting is that, once the capitulation registers, it could last
for up to 6 weeks or more before the low is accomplished. We are now at
the condition reached in October and again in December, 1931. Thus our
view for a tradable rally out of the eventual hole.
Outlook For 2003: The point to be made is that, while the stock
market has been as bad as it was from 1929 to late 1931, the economy is
not in the same category. The unprecedented continuation of the median
home boom is the only reason and, like any bubble since Asia blew out in
1997, every speculation has reached saturation and has collapsed. This is
inevitable and will fit the Austrian School's theory that the boom and
bust are proportionate.
Our work has been empirical rather than theoretical and concludes that all
of the requirements to conclude a post-bubble contraction seem unlikely to
be accomplished within the shorter three-year duration. Without the
intensity of 1929 to 1932, the contraction will likely be prolonged, as
followed the 1873 bubble. The combination of 3 different approaches
suggests that a very worthwhile rally could run from when the low is
accomplished (perhaps in November) until around May.
Thus our advice to increase the equity weighting from 35% to 42%. Why the
7 points? - 7 is lucky.
There are about 50 sub-groups and not all will bottom at the same time.
Confidence: In early January, 2000 we noted that short dated
treasury rates typically soared for some 18 months as a stock mania blows
out. This began the regular reminder that March would be the "18th month".
On January 28, 2000, the Boom Indicators had reversed from the most
positive reading of +12 to +6 and we advised reducing equity exposure from
60% to 40%. The reading has now improved from -12 to -11.
At important lows, as in late 1998, it took from October, 1998 until
February, 1999 to become convincingly positive. It's slow, but some solid
improvement by, say, around March would suggest the end of the bear.
In the meantime, let's consider it as a good potential rebound within a
more leisurely contraction, such as followed the new financial era that
ended in 1873.
Sector Comment: Preliminary work suggests that the utilities could
lag and golds could rally with the orthodox market.
INTEREST RATES
Credit Spreads: Last year, the model expected credit spreads to
widen until around November. The 9/11 atrocity accelerated this and the
crisis drove the junk spread to 825 bp over treasuries on October 2. After
November, spreads were expected to narrow with the other "good stuff"
until around March.
This was prolonged as spread action, seemingly compelled by a shortage of
junk, drove the spread to 535 bp in May. Fortunately, a remarkable
increase in "Fallen Angels" eased the shortage and this week the spread
reached 923 bp.
Our July 19 edition discussed the fact that widening would accelerate in
September to dislocating conditions by December and noted that "this
would involuntarily turn investors into sub-prime lenders".
This seems to be working out.
Yield Curve: Shorter-dated treasuries were expected to increase
with the "good stuff" until around March and then resume the long decline
with the opposite stuff. For example, the 90-day bill rate rose to 1.84%
in March and has declined to 1.55% this week. Our eventual target has been
around 1%.
This natural decline is feeding into the long end for some 6 weeks longer
than we thought possible, but steepening due to long rates rising could be
starting.
The Long Bond: The long bond has become speculative. The refi game
is an unstable loop that is connecting a soaring median home market to
soaring bond prices. Just because everyone is watching the phenomenon and
calling for its end doesn't mean that it won't end.
Part of the play has been to buy SUVs and this seems to be faltering. With
the discounts and zero financing costs, the depreciation on a new car is
larger than ever and is forcing prices down in the second-hand market. The
average car now is a sound driver for at least 10 years so the rage to
have a new one will rapidly be seen as uneconomical.
Perhaps 4 years of record light vehicle sales will be done in by the
3-year bear market. If so, the house mania will follow and, as odd as it
seems, this will be tied to the end of the mania in longer maturities.
Confirming this is the ChartWorks note, as of today, that the 10-year
yield has given a weekly capitulation "buy" reading. This means a
significant increase in longer term interest rates.
Spreads Again: Since May, Merrill's junk index has increased in
yield from 1096 bp to 1395 bp this week. In the same interval, the yield
for a medium grade corp has gone from 788 bp to 701 bp on September 17.
Considering the appropriate carnage in the junk market, this seemed
inappropriate. However, since then the yield has increased to 742 thus
ending the divergence as the spread has widened from 226 bp to 270 bp this
week. This spread narrowed to 197 bp in March.
Real Long Interest Rates: Clearly, real rates have been rising for
junk but have been declining, since May, for better credits. While this is
part of the remarkable speculation in bonds, it should be recognized as
favourable and that section of the Boom Indicators turns one notch
positive. This improves the reading from -12 to -11. The worst reading
possible is -14 and the worst reading reached was the recent -12.
COMMENTS FOR METAL PRODUCERS
Gold: Gold's price relative to commodities sold off from 263 on May
29 to 228 on August 21, from which it based until September 12. Under the
appropriate conditions of the liquidity contraction resuming, the index
has improved to 241.
Gold Shares: Beyond the treasury curve and gold's relative price
share action, at times gold shares anticipate gold rallies.
Our basic model expected the first speculative high in the long bull
market to be set around May (
).
After a relief rally, golds were expected to weaken again as the general
stock market suffered heavy liquidation beginning in early September.
This was reviewed in our September 20 view that "the stock market
plunge could take gold shares with it". The plunge is on and, using
Newmont as the proxy, the ChartWorks suggests that it is within a week of
a "buy" condition. For those who are underweighted, we would start
aggressive buying now.
Gold/Silver Ratio: Money market spreads have finally joined the
distress being suffered by the junk bonds since late July. Needless to
say, this is serious and was confirmed by a rather quick increase in the
gold/silver ratio to 74. This may ease over the next week and last week's
edition discussed the action in brief terms that are worth repeating:
Our June 7 edition noted that silver was at an important top, from
which a long bear market in nominal terms, and relative to gold, would
follow. Silver's high was 510.1 on July 15 as the gold/silver ratio set a
low at 62.5. The piece concluded with "Rising through 70 would anticipate
the next phase of credit distress. Our long term target remains around
110.".
This ratio is not only the oldest price series in history, it also has
the characteristics of a credit spread. In rising to 70.9 in early
September, it anticipated developing distress. On September 26, it broke
71 and, now at 71.8, bank and financial stocks are very weak.
Energy Prices: Our view in June was that both crude oil and natural
gas prices would recover until early October. From a low of 24.12 on June
10, crude recovered 28% to 30.8 on October 1. Natural gas sold off to 2.66
on August 6 and, making up for lost time, zoomed 55% to 4.14 on October 2.
Both have declined a little, but it's enough to break the rising trendline.
As we have outlined, U.S. "Gunboat diplomacy" in Iraq will likely start in
early January. This would force a brief speculative rally in a much longer
downtrend. The money markets are now showing a concerning loss of
liquidity that, with the collapse in the junk market, does not auger well
for global business conditions into next year (credit distress is global).